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Abstract. In Utility Computing business model, the owners of the com-
puting resources negotiate with their potential clients to sell computing
power. The terms of the Quality of Service (QoS) to be provided as well
as the economic conditions are established in a Service-Level Agreement
(SLA). There are situations in which providers must differentiate the
SLAs in function of the type of Client that is willing to access the re-
sources or the agreed QoS e.g. when the hardware resources are shared
between users of the company that own the resources and external users.
This paper proposes to consider the information of potential users when
the SLA is under negotiation to allow providers to prioritize users (e.g.
internal users over external users, or preferential users over common
users). Two policies for negotiation are introduced: price discrimination
and client-aware overselling of resources. The validity of the policies is
demonstrated through exhaustive experiments.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the Utility Computing business model is increasing its accep-
tance in the Information Technology sector [19] thanks to the burst of Cloud
Computing paradigm [8]. In Utility Computing, the users of the resources are
not necessarily their owners: users run their applications or services in remote
data centers and pay in function of the usage, as with other utilities such as
water provision or the electric grid. The terms of the Quality of Service (QoS)
to be provided and the economic conditions are established in a Service-Level
Agreement (SLA). Utility Computing allows the users to economically benefit
from economies of scale, because it minimizes the space and maintenance costs.
However, despite of the economic benefits of using computing as a utility, there
are still open security reasons to not submit the critical or confidential data to
resources that are located in third parties [13].
Companies may decide to hire out the spare resources of their data centers
to external users that do not have such security or confidentiality restrictions
[11]. The price that external users pay to use the resources contributes to amor-
tize the cost of the data centers. However, a binary classification of the users as
internal/external is not accurate enough in many situations. For example, head-
quarters of a big company may classify the users of its data centers according
to different levels: users from the headquarters that owns the resources are com-
pletely internal, users from other companies are completely external, and users
from other headquarters of the same company have an intermediate range. Even
multinationals could define more degrees of proximity for headquarters in the
same country and headquarters in other countries. Whilst completely external
users pay a fee and completely internal users use the resources for free, the users
in between would pay a reduced fee that does not report profit, but encour-
ages each location to only use resources from external locations when strictly
necessary.
Another example of intermediate users are users from trusted entities that
decide to share their computing resources for sharing risks and dealing with
peaks of workload without the need of overprovision resources. Examples of
trusted entities are different companies from the same business cluster [17].
Clients may be classified according to other criteria. Many service providers
classify their clients according to the QoS that they have purchased. For example,
Spotify [5] is an online music provider that classifies its clients in three categories
(free, unlimited and premium) according to their monthly fee. The higher the fee
the more services and QoS: unlimited streaming hours, highest quality of sound,
available downloads, etc. The provider must consider the purchased QoS when
allocating the resources.
The usage of the resources by external users can affect the QoS of internal
users if the SLAs do not reflect priorities between clients in terms of pricing
or allocation of resources. This paper suggests applying Client Classification
to keep high QoS to internal users or users with high QoS requirements. Client
Classification considers the information about the users when giving them access
to the resources and prioritizes some SLAs according to two criteria:
QoS that the users are willing to acquire: the higher the QoS the higher the
price. This is the traditional classification of services in Utility Computing.
Affinity between the client and the provider: clients from the same com-
pany as the provider or from entities that have a privileged relationship with the
provider can hire the services at better prices, better QoS, or any other privilege.
This novel approach was devised with the success of Cluster and Grid Comput-
ing, in which organizations share part of their resources with users from other
organizations. By prioritizing users to which there is high affinity, organizations
can ensure that their internal users will have enough resources or QoS when
there is a peak of external demand.
According to previous considerations, our contributions are:
1. Proposal of new approaches to perform Client Classification in pricing and
SLA allocation policies.
2. Demonstration of the validity of the model through fine-grained experiments
that demonstrate how a provider can reach its Business-Level Objectives
(BLO) without penalizing its internal users or external users with prior-
ity SLAs. The results are evaluated in terms of revenue and proportion of
priority users in the system.
We propose policies to allocate SLAs by pursuing a main BLO: users dif-
ferentiation according of their Affinity/QoS relationship with the provider. In
addition, our model also considers the economic profit as secondary BLO when
negotiating the SLAs: prices at peak hours are higher than prices at off-peak
hours for all the users. In that way, costs are amortized faster and companies are
encouraged to move part of their tasks (such as resource-intensive unattended
batch executions) to hours with low demand, such as the late night.
The experiments have been performed with the Economically Enhanced Re-
source Manager (EERM) simulator [4]: a customizable Cloud market simulator
that applies several Business policies and allows users to define new policies as
JBoss Drools rules [3].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After the discussion of
the related work, Section 3 describes the scenario in which Client Classification
is applied: its participants and some preliminary definitions. Section 4 introduces
the proposed rules for Client Classification: their motivation and their concrete
implementation. Next, Section 5 describes the simulation environment and shows
the experimental results that demonstrate the validity of the rules. At the end,
Section 6 describes the conclusions of this paper and states the future research.
2 Related Work
In this paper, we extend part our previous work in Negotiation Models [16] and
Rule-Based SLA Management for maximizing BLOs [15]. Previous work intro-
duced several policies for maximizing the revenue of providers in Cloud Com-
puting Markets [9,14]: dynamic pricing, overselling of resources, dynamic scaling
of resources, migration of Virtual Machines (VMs), etc. This paper introduces
rules that are essentially similar, but focused in Client Classification from the
provider side.
Many previous works classify SLAs by considering the client information. The
innovation of this paper relies on the proposal of new rules for price discrimi-
nation and client-aware overselling of resources, and their exhaustive evaluation
in terms of revenue, client affinity, QoS, and SLA fulfillment. In addition, whilst
related works tend to classify users in function of their internal/external condi-
tion, this paper defines them in a continuous range between 0 (lowest preference)
to 1 (highest preference).
Client Classification is a usual practice in many businesses, such as banking
services [2]. These businesses categorize clients in function of their size, budget,
etc. and establish policies that define clearly the priorities of the clients, their
protection level, their assigned resources, Quality of Service, etc. In Cloud Com-
puting, Amazon Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2) provides a set of predefined
VM instances [1], each one with different performance profiles (CPU load, Mem-
ory, etc.), but a fixed Quality of Service: they promise that their machines have
an annual availability of 99.5%. This approach may be economically suitable
for huge resource providers, but not for smaller providers. With this paradigm,
small providers should overprovision resources for minimizing risks and provide
high availability. We try to channel the risk to the SLAs with the lowest priority
according to the defined BLOs. In case of SLA violation, the Clients will receive
an economic compensation proportional to the seriousness of the violation.
Previous papers introduced some policies similar to those introduced in this
paper. Sulistio et al. [22] propose overbooking strategies for mitigating the ef-
fects of cancellations and no-shows for increasing the revenue. The overbooking
policies used in this paper consider in addition the possibility of under-usage of
the reserved resources of the client. Dube et al. [10] establish different ranges of
prices for the same resource and analyze an optimization model for a small num-
ber of price classes. Their proposal is similar to our proposal about establishing
Gold, Silver and Bronze ranges and optimizing their QoS performance giving
priority to the contracts that report the highest economic profit. We extend this
work by combining the QoS ranges with several other policies, such as Price
Discrimination. Another main difference between this paper and the work from
Sulistio et al. [22] and Dube et al. [10] is that the main BLO of our work is the
Client Classification instead of the Maximization of the Revenue.
Pu¨schel et al. [18] propose a scheme for Client Classification by means of
price discrimination, different priorities in job acceptance and differentiation in
Quality of Service. They adopt the architecture of an EERM. The EERM sup-
ports the optimization of SLA Negotiation and Management by dealing with
both economic and technical information of Cloud Computing Markets. In addi-
tion, this paper extends the research of Pu¨schel et al. [18] in Client Classification
with the extension and detail of the policies, and deeper validation of them by
means of a tailored simulation of Clients, Cloud Market, EERM, and Resource
Fabrics.
3 Preliminary definitions
A Cloud Market has two main actors: Clients and Providers. Clients try to buy
resources in the Market to host their services, by sending offers to providers
to start a negotiation. Each provider owns a set of N physical machines. Each
physical machine can host several VMs that execute single tasks, such as Web
Services or Batch Jobs. The QoS terms of a task are described in SLA =
{Rev(vt), C,−→S ,∆t}:
– Rev(vt) is a revenue function that describes how much money the provider
earns after finishing correctly or incorrectly a task. vt is the amount of time
in which the provider has not provided the agreed QoS to the client. Let
MP be the Maximum Penalty (can be seen as negative revenue: lower MP
implies higher penalties), MR the Maximum Revenue, MPT the Maximum
Penalty Threshold, and MRT the Maximum Revenue Threshold, Equation
1 describes the revenue function. If vt < MRT the SLA is not violated (0
violations); if vt > MPT , the SLA is completely violated (1 violations).
MPT > vt > MRT implies a partial violation ( vt−MRTMPT−MRT violations).
Rev(vt) =
MP −MR
MPT −MRT (vt−MRT ) +MR (1)
This equation allows a grace period where the provider can violate the SLA
without being penalized. When vt surpasses the MRT threshold, the revenue
linearly decreases (see Figure 1) in function of vt. The Maximum Penalty
MP is defined for avoiding infinite penalties. Client and provider can ne-
gotiate the values of MRT , MR, MPT , MP for establishing different QoS
ranges for the clients, which report different revenues and penalties for the
providers [16].
– C is the client information. Let id be the client identifier and
−−→
CD a vector
that handles the description of the client, then C = {id,−−→CD}. The infor-
mation contained in
−−→
CD must be decided by the System Administrator and
applied consequently in the policies.
–
−→
S describes the QoS of the purchased service: throughput, response time,
and so on.
– ∆t is the time period requested to allocate the task.
The revenue function Rev(vt) (as well as all the revenue figures in the eval-
uation) subtracts the penalties from the incomes, so it indicates how profitable
is the allocation and execution of a SLA with a given set of policies. However,
it does not indicate the provider’s net benefit because it does not consider other
costs, such as infrastructure maintenance.
Fig. 1: Revenue of a SLA in function of the violation time (Equation 1)
3.1 Client Classification criteria
We propose the classification of clients according to the priority that the provider
assigns to them. This priority can be described using two different criteria:
Client Affinity: The affinity (aff ⊆ [0, 1]) measures how the client is related
to the provider. For example, aff = 1 for a completely internal user; aff = 0.25 ∼
0.75 for a client from a company with privileged relationship with the provider
(e.g. in the same business cluster); aff = 0 for a completely external client. The
calculation of the affinity may be different among different providers, depending
on their business goals. How affinity is calculated is not important in this paper:
the main topic is how to discriminate clients in function of their affinity.
Quality of Service: The same Cloud provider could host critical tasks and
tasks that can tolerate lower QoS. For example, e-commerce applications may
need extra QoS guarantees to avoid losing money on service unavailability. It is
reasonable to allow critical clients to buy extra QoS guarantees at higher prices,
and keep cheap prices (but fewer QoS guarantees) for non-critical tasks. The
different ranges of QoS are defined by establishing different values for MRT ,
MR, MPT and MP in Rev(vt) (Equation 1). We define three ranges of QoS,
in descending order: Gold, Silver, and Bronze. The higher the QoS range, the
higher MR and the lower MP , MRT and MPT (lower values of these three
values imply higher penalties).
The policies for Client Classification are applied when the SLAs are negoti-
ated between client and provider and allocated by the provider: the EERM gives
priority to users to which the provider has high affinity when providing access
to the resources by applying policies for Price Discrimination and Overselling of
Resources.
4 Applying Client classification in negotiation time
To facilitate the reading of this paper, the names of the policies have been ab-
breviated according to the next notation: PolicyNamePriorityType. PolicyName
is an abbreviation of the policy name. The abbreviations of all the policies are
shown below, enclosed in parentheses next to their names. PriorityType is an
abbreviation of the magnitude that is used for calculating the priority of the
client: the affinity (Aff) or the Quality of Service (QoS). When the policies for
Client Classification are compared with policies that prioritize the maximization
of the revenue, the abbreviation for this last priority is RM (Revenue Maximiza-
tion). As example, Price Discrimination policies that apply discount to clients
according to their affinity are notated as PrDscAff .
The proposed policies are:
Price discrimination (PrDsc): The price of a task varies in function of
the time slot, the workload of the resources of the provider, and the amount of
resources required for providing the agreed QoS [16]. In addition, we propose to
apply discounts to clients proportionally to their affinity.
Overselling of Resources (Ovrs): Clients do not always use all the re-
sources that they buy. In consequence, the spare resources are resold to other
clients according to their priority. This policy will increase both the revenue of
the provider and the average priority of the clients in the system.
4.1 Price Discrimination (PrDsc)
In our previous works, providers dynamically establish the prices for maximizing
their revenue. They ask for high prices when the workload is high (peak hours)
and low prices when it is low (off-peak hours) [16,15]. This maximizes the profit
by attracting clients when the system is idle and maximizing prices when the
demand is high.
PrDscAff policy is built on top of the PrDscRM policy: after calculating
the best resource allocation for maximizing the economic profit according to the
Dynamic Pricing policies introduced in our previous works (PrDscRM ) [16,15],
the calculated revenue is multiplied by (1 − affinity). This allows users with
some affinity to receive a discount that is proportional to their affinity. This
policy combines Client Classification with Revenue Maximization as a secondary
BLO and always considers affinity as the main priority. Multiplying price by
(1−affinity) will linearly prioritize users (a user whose affinity is 1 will have the
double of priority than a user whose affinity is 0.5). However, other distributions
such as (1− affinity2) could be considered in function of the provider policies.
The PrDscQoS policy is not considered because it would not have sense:
Gold tasks must not be cheaper than Silver tasks, and Silver tasks must not be
cheaper than Bronze tasks.
4.2 Overselling of resources (Ovrs)
Sometimes the clients do not use all the capacity that they have reserved because
they tend to slightly overprovision the required computing resources that they
finally use. Thanks to Cloud Computing elasticity mechanisms, the overprovi-
sioning required by clients is very low [12]. However, the summation of the spare
resources of all the clients may be sold to other clients to increase the resources
usage.
We propose the sale of capacity that has been sold previously but the client
is not using: when a client negotiates a SLA and there are not enough resources
to allocate it, the scoring function in Equation 2 is calculated over the set
j = {1 . . . N} of N physical machines. The physical resource j with the highest
positive score is selected as candidate for executing the task and the PrDsc pol-
icy is triggered for establishing a price. If there are not physical resources whose








The terms of Equation 2 are described herewith:
– Rreq(t) is a constant function that represents the amount of bottleneck re-
sources requested in the SLA under negotiation.
– Rj(t) is a constant function that represents the amount of bottleneck re-
sources in the physical resource j.
– Let Rused(t) be a prediction of the bottleneck resources that the SLA under
negotiation will use; let δ ⊂ [0, 1] be the maximum percentage to penalize or
unpenalize the predicted workload in function of the client priority P . The
priority-corrected prediction is defined as R′used(t) = (1 + δ − 2δP )Rused(t).
The prediction of the used resources is artificially increased when the priority
of the client that negotiates the SLA is low and artificially decreased when
the priority is high.
The amount of resources used by services at a given time can be obtained
from monitoring information. The prediction of resource usage for a given ser-
vice (Rused(t)) can be calculated statistically or by several Machine Learning
algorithms [20] from the monitoring information. In this paper, we use the CPU
usage from Resource Monitoring because it is the bottleneck resource for the ma-
jority of services to be executed in the Cloud Provider. Equation 2 is abstract
enough to allow using any other type of resource, such as memory or network
bandwidth.
The corrections made in R′used(t) will motivate a higher acceptance of clients
to which the provider has high affinity. As example, δ = 0.4 in the experiments.
This value is only chosen for showing the tendency of the graphs. Higher values
of δ would decrease the revenue and increase both the average affinity and the
number of SLA violations. Lower values of δ would have the opposite effect.
5 Experimental results
This section describes the experimental environment and its configuration values.
We have used the EERM Simulator [4] to execute and evaluate the policies
that are introduced in this paper. The EERM Simulator is a fine-grained Cloud
Market simulator, which simulates the complete cycle of a Cloud Resource sale
and execution: services discovery, SLA negotiation process between provider and
client, execution of web services or batch jobs and monitoring of the resources.
It supports many features of Cloud Computing, such as elasticity of resources
or migration of VMs. In addition, it integrates the Drools [3] Rule Engine to
configure the SLA allocation and management policies in function of the BLOs
(e.g. the Client Classification policies described in this paper).
The advantages of using a simulation environment instead of real machines
is the possibility of generate more data with fewer resources in less time, so the
evaluation is more accurate. For every experiment, a total of 64 CPUs working
during a week have been simulated using real web workloads to acquire statisti-
cally representative data.
5.1 Simulation Environment
The constant values and the parameters of the simulation described are arbi-
trary because there are no real market traces to extract data from. Different
real market scenarios could require different values, but the contribution of this
paper is to show how Client Classification reports benefit qualitatively but
not quantitatively. In other words, the paper shows how a given policy can im-
prove the average affinity of the clients that use the system but not whether its
values are optimum, because they would vary in function of the market status.
In our future work, the provider will automatically adjust its parameters for
self-adapting to changing market environments.
A Cloud Market has two main actors: Clients and Providers. Providers of-
fer VMs of variable sizes. Clients try to buy resources in the Market to host
Fig. 2: Sample pattern of web workload
their services, by sending offers that contain {QoS,C,−→S ,∆t}, in which QoS =
{Gold, Silver,Bronze}. For the same task in equal time and load conditions,
the maximum price that the client is willing to pay for Gold QoS is 50% higher
than the one for Silver QoS, and the maximum price that the client is willing to
pay for Silver QoS is 20% higher than the one for Bronze QoS.
The Web workload is acquired from a real anonymous ISP (see figure 2), and
varies in function of the hour of the day and the day of the week [7].
When the offer is in the market, the providers that accept it return a revenue
function Rev(vt), which specifies the prices and penalties to pay for the execution
of that service. Finally, the client chooses the provider with a best price and time
schedule for its interests and sends him a confirmation.
When a provider checks the offer from the client, it applies Machine Learning
techniques to predict future workloads and verify whether the offered job can be
executed correctly [20,21]. A bad prediction might entail a violation of the SLA.
In all the simulations, four different Cloud providers sell their services in a
market during a week. For each experiment there is:
1. A provider that executes all the introduced policies until that subsection. It
prioritizes users to which there is high affinity.
2. Same as Provider 1, but prioritizing tasks with high QoS.
3. A provider that executes all the introduced policies until the previous subsec-
tion. It prioritizes users to which the provider has high affinity in experiments
that compare it with Provider 1 or tasks with high QoS in experiments that
compare it with Provider 2. In the first section, it does not execute any policy
and uses a fixed pricing schema as current Cloud providers [1,6].
4. A provider that executes the same policies as Providers 1 and 2 but without
client classification as a main BLO. Its priority is the maximization of the
economic profit [15].
Every provider belongs to a different organization. All of them have the
same number of resources: two 8-CPU physical machines. Every provider has an
affinity higher than 0 to the 25% of the clients in the market, and equal to 0 to
the other 75% of clients. The affinity of the clients of the same organization than
the provider ranges from 0 (non-inclusive) to 1 (inclusive) following a uniform
distribution. Summarizing, the average affinity of all the clients is ∼ 0.21 for
every provider.
Each client asks for Gold, Silver or Bronze QoS, independently of their or-
ganization. 1/6 of the clients ask for Gold QoS, 2/6 ask for Silver QoS, and 3/6
ask for Bronze QoS.
It is important to evaluate how the providers behave and how effective the
policies are in different scenarios. For example, if there are many providers and
few clients, the prices and the load of the system will be low; if there are too many
clients and the providers cannot host all of them, prices and the system workload
will be high. To evaluate the policies in all the scenarios, the experiments are
repeated with different offer/demand ratios for each policy, gradually from low
to high demand.
5.2 Price Discrimination (PrDsc)
Figure 3a compares the average affinity of the clients that buy services in providers
that are competing in the market (see Section 5). Every provider has different
policies for Price Discrimination: NoPrDsc policy, PrDscRM , and PrDscAff .
The x axis shows the number of clients in each experiment, and the y axis rep-
resents the average affinity of the clients that used each resource. Each column
group represents the obtained results of the providers in different experiments.
The figure shows that the provider that implements PrDscAff increments the
average affinity of its clients by 50%. The average affinity of clients in providers
without PrDscAff is almost the same as the average affinity of all the clients in
the market (∼ 0.21).
(a) Average affinity (b) Revenue
Fig. 3: Average affinity and revenue when using different PrDsc policies
Figure 3b is structured similarly to Figure 3a, but instead of showing the
average affinity for each provider in each experiment, it shows the revenue of
the providers (y axis). It shows that revenue is noticeably decreased if compared
with fixed-pricing and revenue maximization providers. It is demonstrated that
the increment of the average affinity of the clients of PrDscAff penalizes the
revenue. To compensate the impact in revenue of PrDscAff , hardware resources
may be oversold as explained in next section.
5.3 Resources Overselling (Ovrs)
Figure 4a has a similar structure to Figure 3a: it shows the average affinity
of the clients according to the policy combination in the provider. The three
providers apply PrDscAff but they differ in how they implement Overselling.
The provider of the previous section is labeled NoOvrs, because it does not
apply Overselling. To compare the usefulness of overselling based on affinity
discrimination (OvrsAff ), the figure also includes the results of a provider that
performs PrDscAff , but its overselling policy is driven by revenue instead of
affinity (labeled as OvrsRM ). As the intention of OvrsQoS is not to attract
clients to which the provider has high affinity, this policy is not included in the
figure. Figure 4a shows that not considering the client affinity in the overselling
policy decreases average affinity of the clients. It is not caused by any type of
penalization, but it is a statistical fact: more clients enter the system, regardless
their affinity. OvrsAff maintains similar affinity levels to those of NoOvrs but








































Fig. 4: Average affinity and revenue when using different Ovrs policies
Figure 4b compares the revenue of four providers. All four implement PrDscAff ,
but different overselling policies. The provider labeled as NoOvrs does not ap-
ply any overselling policy, as in previous section. The other providers apply
overselling policies based on Revenue Maximization (OvrsRM ), affinity discrim-
ination (OvrsAff ), and QoS range (OvrsQoS). Figure 4b shows that all the
overselling policies have a positive impact on earnings. The provider labeled as
NoOvrs is the lower bound and the provider labeled as OvrsRM is the higher
bound. OvrsAff and OvrsQoS stay in the middle of both: the clients are clas-
sified without renouncing the revenue completely. The revenue with OvrsAff
is lower than the revenue with OvrsQoS because OvrsQoS prioritizes Gold and







































Fig. 6: Average affinity of the violations when using OvrsAff
However, overselling considerably increases the number of SLA violations
(Figure 5) because of two reasons: the associated error to the predictor compo-
nent, and the permissiveness with clients to which the provider has high affinity
in terms of workload that makes the provider to violate a highest proportion
of SLAs of this kind of clients (Figure 6). The provider that applies OvrsQoS
reports the highest number of violations because Gold and Silver SLAs have
Fig. 7: Proportion of violations by QoS range when using OvrsQoS
stricter requirements that are more difficult to accomplish, as shown in Figure
7. Despite the increase in the number of violations, the proportion of violated
SLAs over the total of allocated SLAs remains below 2% in the worst case. Figure
7 is a stacked chart that shows the percentage of each QoS range from the total
of violations for OvrsQoS provider in several market simulations with different
number of clients. It shows that the higher the QoS rank, the higher the per-
centage of violated SLAs. More violations of high-QoS SLAs do not mean that
the QoS for Gold SLAs is lower than the QoS for Silver SLAs: it is more difficult
to achieve the QoS requirements of Gold SLAs because the QoS requirements
are higher, but an achievement of 90% of the QoS for Gold is still higher than
the 100% of the QoS for Silver or Bronze.
The negative effects of OvrsAff and OvrsQoS can be minimized by apply-
ing policies for runtime management of resources from our previous work [15]:
usage of VMs elasticity, selective SLA violation and live migration of VMs for
dynamically reconfiguring the Cloud data centers and minimize the number of
violations.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have introduced a set of policies for managing SLAs in a
Cloud provider considering the classification of clients. Two facets can be used
to classify the clients: client affinity and QoS. These policies have been evaluated
through experiments that show the improvement of adding each policy to the
set of previously introduced policies. We have introduced PrDsc and Ovrs for
increasing the proportion of high-priority SLAs in the provider. After the ap-
plication of all the policies, the EERM increases the number of priority clients
(high-affinity or Gold and Silver, depending on the chosen type of priority), keep-
ing a reasonable compromise between giving access preference to priority users
and keep a high revenue from non-priority users.
We conclude that Client Classification policies in SLA negotiation achieve
their objectives: the percentage of priority users is increased when applying them
in negotiation time. Classification by QoS is suitable for a pure Cloud provider
whose business is only based on selling its resources (it does not use them for its
internal applications). Classification by affinity is more suitable for organizations
that mix internal and external applications on their resources.
The policies presented in this paper rely on some constant values that may
not lead to the optimum achievement of the BLOs. However, getting the op-
timum results is not the main objective in this paper. The key value of this
work is to show the tendencies of applying the explained policies in terms of
increment of high-priority clients that use the system. The aim to further im-
prove brings a research opportunity for future work: adding dynamism to rules
to allow them self-adapting at runtime. Dynamic Rules will allow providers to
autonomously adapt to the changes in the environment and achieve the optimum
results according to their own BLOs.
Applying the policies enhances client classification but also increases the
number of SLA violations and the proportion of violations of high-priority SLAs.
Since the violations percentage is acceptable (below 2% of the allocated SLAs),
we can state that the advantages of applying PrDsc and Ovrs outweight the
disadvantages for achieving the BLO for which both policies have been designed.
Our previous work in Rule-based SLA Management [15] introduced several
policies for mitigating the negative effects of Ovrs policies. Our future work will
enhance existent policies for resources elasticity, selective SLA violation and live
migration of VMs, by adding them client awareness to allow highest achievement
of Client Classification BLOs.
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